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*P.L. 6 The Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 creates a new integrated ombudsman
service for Wales which brings together the three separate offices of Welsh Administration
Ombudsman, Health Service Commissioner for Wales and the Welsh Local Government
Ombudsman.1 This development follows the pattern of reform in Scotland2 and the proposed reforms
in England,3 which involve integration of the separate ombudsman schemes in the public sector in
those countries. The Act was passed on April 6, 2005, and the new system is likely to come into effect
on April 1, 2006. Meanwhile, the interim system which has been in place since 2004 will continue.
Background
Proposals for reform of the Welsh system were originally mooted in August 1998, when the Advisory
Group to the Welsh Assembly recommended to the (then) Secretary of State for Wales that the posts
of three of the ombudsmen in Wales should be combined. At that time, Wales had four separate
ombudsman systems dealing with complaints about public services: the UK Parliamentary
Ombudsman,4 the Welsh *P.L. 7 Administration Ombudsman,5 the Health Service Ombudsman for
Wales,6 and the Local Government Ombudsman for Wales.7 Three of these posts were held by the
same person.8
In March 2001, the Secretary of State for Wales and the Welsh Assembly Government announced
that there was to be a joint review of the public sector ombudsman service in Wales, although it was
not until December 2002 that a consultation paper9 was issued, setting out the case for change, with
the provisional view that there should be one ombudsman for Wales.10 This proposal received
unanimous support,11 and a further consultation paper sought views on the remit of the proposed new
office.12
The interim system, in place since 2004, involves one person holding all three offices, operating
under three separate pieces of legislation. Adam Peat was appointed as Health Service Ombudsman
and Local Government Ombudsman in Wales in October 2003, and designated as the non-statutory
Public Services Ombudsman for Wales, by the First Minister and the Secretary of State for Wales the
following month. He was appointed as Welsh Assembly Ombudsman in November 2004, after the
statutory restriction preventing one person holding all three offices simultaneously was removed.13
The National Assembly for Wales' law-making powers are limited to the making of delegated
legislation where this power has been specifically granted in an Act of Parliament. Thus, legislative
recognition for this interim measure could only be effected by the Westminster Parliament, and
parliamentary time was allocated in the 2004-05 session. The Bill was introduced in the House of
Lords in November 2004, and time was found before the pre-election dissolution of Parliament to
secure its passage, helped no doubt by the fact that the Bill was uncontroversial, giving statutory
basis to what was the de facto position.
*P.L. 8 An integrated office
There can now be little dispute that integration of the public sector ombudsman schemes is
appropriate and desirable. This is the pattern adopted in Scotland, the de facto position in Northern
Ireland, and the proposed scheme for England. The reasons for integration relate to the changes in
delivery of public services, jurisdictional gaps and overlaps, efficiencies, customer focus, and
opportunities for a higher profile service. An additional factor for Wales is that there were four
separate schemes serving a relatively small population.14
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The statutory title of the new ombudsman is the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales, the name
“ombudsman” being preferred in the legislation, rather than the traditional “commissioner”.
“Ombudsman” has now become the accepted nomenclature, despite the fact that the legislation
establishing the public sector ombudsmen in the United Kingdom has in the past used the term
“commissioner”. The ombudsman is appointed by Her Majesty the Queen, on the recommendation of
the Secretary of State, who can only make the recommendation after prior consultation with the
Assembly. The ombudsman is not a civil servant and cannot be a member of the Assembly or any of
the local authorities within his remit. The ombudsman can appoint such staff as necessary, and these
staff will not be civil servants. Unlike the position in Scotland, the legislation makes no provision for
the appointment of deputies, and this was a deliberate strategy, in order to ensure that there would be
a truly integrated office.
Although this was an uncontroversial Bill, there was some concern about the terms of appointment of
the ombudsman. Traditionally, ombudsmen in the United Kingdom hold office until they retire at 65,
although they can ask to be relieved of office earlier, and can be removed on medical grounds or for
misbehaviour. The consultation document had raised the question as to whether there should be
fixed-term appointments, with or without the possibility of reappointment. In Scotland, the ombudsman
is appointed for five years, with the possibility of reappointment for a further term, and in exceptional
circumstances, for a third term. The advantage of fixed-term appointments is that they encourage new
approaches and ideas, and can thus more easily reinvigorate the office. The disadvantages are the
loss of continuity and experience, and, more importantly, the perception that this may challenge the
independence of the office.15 It was decided that a fixed term was appropriate, and the Bill originally
had a fixed term of 10 years. In the debate in the House of Lords, a number of Lords expressed
disquiet about this 10-year term. All accepted the need for a fixed term appointment, and most felt
that *P.L. 9 there should be no opportunity for reappointment.16 Although it was felt that the term had
to be long enough to attract candidates, the general feeling was that a 10-year term would be “almost
a guaranteed job for life”.17 The Bill was amended to a seven-year fixed term, with no possibility of
renewal, an amendment which was well supported.18
The funding for the new office will be provided by the Assembly,19 from a budget submitted by the
ombudsman to the Assembly Cabinet. This budget will be laid before the Assembly with modifications
as appropriate, but the Secretary of State must be consulted if there are to be any modifications.
There will thus be a strong incentive to pass the budget, which will help to ensure that the
independence of the office is not compromised. The Assembly, besides being the paymaster, is also
subject to the ombudsman's remit, and it is therefore important that the arrangements for funding
ensure that the actual and perceived independence of the office is not undermined.
Remit
Although there is general acceptance of the need for an integrated ombudsman service, there can be
disagreement about the appropriate remit. Traditionally, ombudsmen in the United Kingdom have
been confined to examining complaints about maladministration, and have had to steer away from
any examination of the merits of decisions. Maladministration has never been defined in legislation,
but it has proved to be a highly flexible concept, and the Parliamentary Ombudsman has noted that,
“properly interpreted”, it can provide “sufficient flexibility to permit investigation” in appropriate cases.20
The Public Services Ombudsman for Wales conforms to this longestablished model, the remit mainly
being a combination of the remits of the three existing offices, that is, complaints alleging
maladministration. There has, however, been an expansion of the remit in that the ombudsman can
also investigate service failure, and failure to provide a service. There is, however, no power to
question the merits of decisions taken without maladministration in the exercise of an authority's
discretion.
In the area of health and social care there has also been a change. The existing power of the Health
Service Ombudsman allows for an investigation into clinical judgment. The new Act allows the
ombudsman not only to investigate complaints about clinical care and treatment in the NHS, but also
the exercise of professional judgment in connection with health and social care. The widening of the
remit was made as a result of a government amendment *P.L. 10 in the House of Lords. Its rationale
is that clinical judgment is too narrow a concept, and that it was inconsistent and illogical for the
judgment of doctors can be called into question but not that of social workers or occupational
therapists, for example, who may be working on the same case.21
The ombudsman also has the remit of investigating complaints about the conduct of local government
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members and employees, which was part of the remit of the Local Government Ombudsman for
Wales.
The bodies subject to the ombudsman's jurisdiction are the Assembly,22 local authorities, fire and
police authorities, various Welsh environmental agencies, health and social care authorities, social
landlords, schools and other educational establishments. These bodies are listed in Sch.3 to the Act,
and there is power for the Assembly to amend this list if necessary. The ombudsman's remit is
specifically Welsh, and complaints cannot be investigated if they relate to the functions of the listed
authorities outside Wales. This limitation does not apply to cross-border functions, nor to functions in
relation to the Welsh language or any other aspect of Welsh culture, as these are regarded as being
discharged in relation to Wales.
In addition to the exclusion in relation to non-Welsh matters, the ombudsman's remit is also subject to
the usual exclusions in relation to alternative remedies. Thus, the ombudsman cannot investigate a
complaint where there is a right of appeal or review to tribunal; where there is an appeal to a Minister
or the Assembly; or where there is a remedy by way of proceedings in court. There is, however, a
discretion to deal with these, if it is not reasonable to expect a person to use these remedies. In
practice, ombudsmen have been fairly generous in exercising this discretion in favour of
complainants. The ombudsman cannot investigate complaints which relate to the investigation or
prevention of crime, the security of the state, or the commencement or conduct of court proceedings.
Employment matters are excluded from remit, as are rent determinations and school internal matters.
All these exclusions are similar, but not identical, to those of the Parliamentary Ombudsman, and are
an amalgamation of the existing exclusions.
Procedures and powers
One of the problems with the previous legislation was that it was inflexible and restrictive, and with an
emphasis on formal investigations and published reports. The approach adopted in the new Act is
more flexible, and recognises that current ombudsman practice is focused on finding resolutions to
complaints, and using the most appropriate means to do so. The Act specifically provides for the
alternative resolution of complaints, in addition to or instead of conducting an investigation.
Investigations are to be conducted in private, but subject to that, it is for the ombudsman to decide on
the procedure for investigation, and this can involve different procedures for different types of
complaints.
*P.L. 11 Complaints must be made in writing (including electronic means), and must be made within
a year of the complainant first having notice of the matters alleged in the complaint. A complaint can
also be referred to the ombudsman by an authority. Anyone who has sustained injustice or hardship
as a result of maladministration or service failure can make a complaint. Complaints can thus be
made by individuals, companies and other corporate bodies. There can be legal or other
representation for complainants, at the ombudsman's discretion, and payment can be made to those
attending or supplying information, for expenses and loss of time. The ombudsman has discretion
whether to begin, continue or discontinue an investigation, and can begin or continue to investigate if
the complaint is withdrawn. Before a complaint will be accepted, the authority complained about must
have had a reasonable opportunity to investigate and respond to it. If the ombudsman decides not to
investigate or to discontinue an investigation, a statement of reasons for this decision has to be sent
to the complainant, the authority, and others that the ombudsman thinks appropriate.
Like other ombudsmen, the Welsh ombudsman has statutory powers to enable him or her to carry out
investigations and other actions. Thus, there are statutory provisions to compel documents and
information to be produced. Enforcement, where necessary, can be dealt with by the High Court. Any
information obtained by the ombudsman cannot be disclosed except for the purposes of the
investigation process. The legislation also provides for the ombudsman to consult and co-operate with
other ombudsmen,23 if the complaint could be investigated by that other ombudsman, and allows for
joint investigations and reporting.24
Remedies
The public sector ombudsmen in the United Kingdom make recommendations of various kinds after
an investigation. In some cases this involves compensation,25 but it may also be some other action by
the authority to rectify the matter. Their awards are not binding, and cannot be enforced by a court of
law. This approach has usually presented no problems, with authorities normally complying with the
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ombudsman's recommendations.26 The consultation document was clear that the new ombudsman
had no need for greater powers of enforcement, and that to add them would make the ombudsman's
investigations “much closer in character to judicial investigations, *P.L. 12 with the problems of more
formal processes, additional cost and more defensive attitudes by public bodies”.27 Indeed,
ombudsmen themselves are reluctant to have compulsory powers, on the basis that this is not
necessary and might jeopardise the cooperative relationship they have with the authorities they
investigate, making the process more legalistic and defensive.28
This area proved to be a controversial aspect of the legislation. The Act contains the usual powers for
the ombudsman to issue reports to interested parties after investigations,29 with a requirement for
authorities to publicise them and make copies available for inspection.30 Where there is a finding of
injustice or hardship, the authority must consider the report and notify the ombudsman of the action it
has taken or will take in response.31 There is also an alternative procedure for reporting cases where
no injustice or hardship has been found, or where an authority has agreed to implement the
ombudsman's recommendations within an agreed time-scale, after a finding of injustice or hardship.
In these cases, provided the public interest does not require a published report, the report is sent only
to the complainant and the authority, and there is no necessity for the authority to publicise it. This
procedure gives statutory recognition to the importance of flexibility for the ombudsman, allowing the
investigative process to be used for obtaining resolutions and learning lessons, rather than naming
and shaming. Where an authority does not implement the ombudsman's recommendations, a special
report can be issued, which can be published by the ombudsman at the authority's expense.32 If the
special report relates to the Assembly, it must be laid before the Assembly by the First Secretary, who
will move that the Assembly resolve to approve the recommendations.
These powers of reporting and issuing special reports where there is a failure to follow the
ombudsman's recommendation are in line with other public sector ombudsman remedies. However,
concern was expressed during the report stage of the legislation that this was not sufficient, as the
ombudsman had no sanction against a totally recalcitrant authority,33 and that there must be some
way of ensuring that the citizen obtained redress in such circumstances.34 There was thus an
amendment, narrowly agreed to against government opposition,35 which allows the ombudsman to
apply to the High Court where *P.L. 13 an authority has disregarded the recommendations without
lawful excuse.36 It will be interesting to see whether this power makes any difference to the operation
of the system in Wales.
Advice and accountability
The previous three ombudsmen schemes provided for the publication of annual reports, to be laid
before the National Assembly in the case of the Welsh Administration Ombudsman and the Health
Service Ombudsman for Wales, and in the case of the Local Government Ombudsman for Wales,
publication took place after consultation with the Welsh Local Government Association. The new
system will involve the preparation of an annual report, and any other report deemed necessary,
which will be laid before the Assembly. The latter reports will also be sent to the relevant authority.
The consultation document raised the issue about whether there should be some formal mechanisms
for advising the ombudsman, similar to the existing general power to obtain advice in order to assist
them in their work,37 and also whether the ombudsman should have an advisory board, perhaps with
members representing the users of public services, and those with knowledge of specific areas of
public administration. Although the legislation provides for the ombudsman to seek advice, there is no
provision in the Act for the establishment of an advisory board. This omission accords with the
general view among ombudsmen that any such board should be organised on a voluntary,
non-statutory basis,38 as there is a danger that such a board could compromise the independence of
the office.
Conclusion
The ombudsman system in Wales was in need of review, partly as a result of devolution, where the
creation of another ombudsman had focused attention on a system with multiple ombudsmen,
causing confusion, duplication and inefficiencies. Combining the schemes addresses these problems,
and accords with developments elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Although the new ombudsman in
Wales incorporates the features of the three schemes it replaces, there are some important
differences. First, the Act makes specific reference to the use of other techniques for resolving
complaints, rather than directing them into a formal investigative process. There has also been an
extension of the remit beyond maladministration, allowing the ombudsman to investigate allegations
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of service failure. In relation to health and social *P.L. 14 care, the remit has been extended beyond
clinical judgment to professional judgment. In addition, the ombudsman has been appointed for a
nonrenewable fixed term. It is of course too soon to evaluate the new office, but the legislative
framework, while not presenting any radical changes, seems to provide for a flexible system which
can more easily respond to complaints in an appropriate manner. It remains to be seen, of course,
whether pressure will now grow for legislation to integrate the schemes in England.
Mary Seneviratne39
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